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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-DISMISSAL OF APPEAL AS EXERCISE
OF CONTEMPT POWER-A superior court of the state of Washington rendered
a $475,000 judgment against the petitioner union for the circulation of a
libelous letter. The union filed an appeal to the Washington Supreme
Court but obtained no stay of proceedings in the lower court because it
made no offer of the required supersedeas bond. In a supplemental proceeding it was learned that the union had no substantial assets in Washington but did have $298,000 of United States bonds in its possession in
California. The Superior Court ordered the union to deliver these bonds
to the court's receiver to protect the judgment creditors pending the appeal
of the main action. Upon failure to comply with the court order, the
union was held in contempt. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed
the contempt and ordered the appeal in the main action dismissed if the
union did not purge itself of contempt within fifteen days.1 The condition
was not met and the appeal was dimissed. On certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, tvm justices dissenting. The dismissal
of the union's appeal was a reasonable action taken to sustain the effectiveness of the state's judicial process and did not violate due process of law.
National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 75
S.Ct. 92 (1954).
The proposition that a statutory review is not a requirement of due
process has been recognized in stronger cases than the instant one, namely,
where the judgment in the lower court resulted in the loss of life ,or liberty.2 A right of appeal is not essential to due process as long as there is

1 Arnold v. National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, 42 Wash. (2d) 648,
257 P. (2d) 629 (1953). This was on May 26, 1953. The original order to deliver the
bonds to the court was made by the superior court on February 15, 1952, and the appeal
from the original money judgment was not finally dismissed until August 19, 1953.
2 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S.Ct. 913 (1894); Allen v. Georgia, 166
U.S. 138, 17 S.Ct. 525 (1897).
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a fair trial in the first instance,3 for it is not "one of those fundamental
rights, the observance of which is indispensable to the liberty of the
citizen."4 But a court has no power to strike the defendant's answer from
the record as punishment for contempt, since that completely denies him
a hearing on the merits of his case.5 Since the union had already been
given a fair hearing, the only real question the court answers is whether
or not the state action was so arbitrary that it amounted to a denial of the
fundamental fairness and justice which comprise the Court's subjective
tests for due process. 6 The test is one of reasonableness, and the case
affords some guidance as to what may comprise the future application of
that standard to the punishment of contempt. Generally, punishment for
civil contempt should be remedial, benefiting the complainant by coercing
the contemnor to do what he has hitherto refused to do.7 The contemnor
usually gets relief from punishment by complying with the court order.8
Yet in the principal case, once the appeal was dismissed, the contemnor
could no longer get relief by purging itself of contempt.9 Nevertheless,
the dismissal was held to be a reasonable measure for the protection of the
judgment creditor, in view of the fact that the union's assets in California
could not be reached as long as the appeal was still pending in Washington.
It is interesting to observe that the majority did not consider the possibility
that the main suit and the supplemental proceeding were, in effect, two
independent actions, as they would have been at common law.10 Such a
possibility would have raised a question as to the reasonableness of a
punishment for contempt which cuts off the contemnor's right to appeal
a case other than that in which he is guilty of the contempt. Yet, according to the broad language used by the court, even this would seem to be
a reasonable exercise of the contempt power as long as the contemnor's
3 Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S. 74, 50 S.Ct.
228 (1930).
4 Allen v. Georgia, note 2 supra, at 141.
5 Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409, 17 S.Ct. 841 (1897). However a statute denying a
right to present a defense in the original suit is not contrary to due process if the
defendant refuses to produce witnesses and material evidence particularly within his
knowledge. In such a case the defendant's action creates a presumption of bad faith
and want of merit in its answer. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 29
S.Ct. 370 (1909).
6 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948).
7 Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492 (1911).
8 See 39 CALIF. L. REv. 552 (1951).
9 In spite of the statement to the contrary in the principal case (at 44), once the
dismissal of the appeal from the judgment became final, it could no longer be viewed
as merely a process to induce compliance with a court order; it had become a fixed
punishment for criminal contempt.
10 It is generally admitted that the supplemental proceeding is merely a simple and
expedient method of inquiring into the affairs of the debtor and one which takes the
place of the creditor's bill in equity. Arnold v. National Union of Marine Cooks and
Stewards, 42 Wash. (2d) 648, 257 P. (2d) 629 (1953); Lore v. Citizens Bank of Winslow,
51 Ariz. 191, 75 P. (2d) 371 (1938). There is even a conflict of authority as to whether
new service of process must be made for the supplemental proceeding. See the cases
cited in 39 A.L.R. 1498 (1925).
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conduct in the one action is such that it jeopardizes satisfaction of the
money judgment secured in the other.11 The fact that the majority is not disturbed by the duality of the proceedings in the case leads one to presume
that the reasonableness of a state court's exercise of its contempt powers
to dismiss an appeal will not be scrutinized too closely in determining
whether or not a contemnor has been denied due process of faw under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Morton A. Polster, S.Ed.

11 Principal

case at 44.

